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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A
Constitutional Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of aerial surveillance as a crime-fighting tool has
been hailed by police as a "new era in law enforcement methods.""
In agricultural states surveillance by airplanes, helicopters, and
even the old U-2 spy planes2 is proving to be an effective weapon
in curtailing the cultivation and distribution of marijuana.' In ad-
dition, federal agencies are using satellite surveillance and aerial
photography to detect industries in violation of clean air and water
regulations.4 The success and repeated use of aerial surveillance as
a police investigatory tool has spawned a new area of fourth
amendment search and seizure analysis.5
The Supreme Court's formulation of the "reasonable expecta-
1. DeFoor, Houston Police Department's Eye in the Sky, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
'Sept. 1981, at 1, 2.
2. Tell, Suits Sight Spies in Sky, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 1, 28, cols. 2-3.
This article reports that the U-2 spy planes can locate objects on the ground from up to
65,000 feet in the air.
3. The Tennessee Department of Safety reported that highway patrol helicopter pilots
discovered and seized 1.6 million marijuana plants in the state through aerial surveillance
during the first eight months of 1981. The marijuana seized and destroyed had an estimated
street value of $500 million. The Tennessean, Oct. 17, 1981, at 13, col. 2.
4. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is using aerial surveil-
lance to trace air and water pollution back to their industrial sources. The EPA and Dow
Chemical Co. are currently engaged in litigation in a Bay City, Michigan, federal court con-
cerning the EPA's aerial surveillance of Dow factories. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 21, 1981, at 17, col.
2.
In 1978, state and federal prosecutors used evidence from satellite photography of the
National Aeronautic and Space Administration to convict the Reserve Mining Co. of Minne-
sota for dumping hazardous wastes into Lake Superior. Tell, supra note 2, at 28, col. 1.
5. The fourth amendment provides in relevant part that "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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tion of privacy" test in Katz v. United States6 expanded search
and seizure analysis to encompass the problems of electronic eaves-
dropping and bugging. When considering aerial surveillance
problems, however, most courts have held that airborne observa-
tion of "open fields" or areas in "open view" is not a search and
hence not subject to fourth amendment regulation.7 Even when the
defendant has shielded his property from ground view, many
courts have held that he did not meet the Katz reasonable expec-
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz the Supreme Court held that the government's war-
rantless eavesdropping on the defendant's phone conversation inside a closed public tele-
phone booth violated the fourth amendment.
7. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless aerial surveillance
of seacoast border property upheld), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981); United States v.
Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (warrantless aerial surveillance upheld because
property was in "open view"); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (warrantless aerial surveillance upheld because property was in "open view").
A number of state appellate and supreme courts have confronted aerial surveillance
issues. The fourth amendment of the federal constitution is made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Additionally, many state
courts base their search and seizure holdings on state constitutional law.
In California: Tuttle v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 320, 174 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981)
(warrantless aerial surveillance of agricultural lands in open view is constitutional; common
habits of farmers do not merit reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 571 (1981); People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1981) (common habits; open view); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (1980) (warrantless aerial surveillance upheld in places where no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy exists; common habits); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d
421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979) (common habits); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d
836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (five-foot high fence did not obscure stolen auto from ground
view, hence no subjective expectation of privacy); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (origin of common habits approach). But see People v. Sneed,
32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (warrantless aerial surveillance at altitude of
20-25 feet held unconstitutional).
In Hawaii: State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (warrantless aerial
surveillance upheld when property in open view). But see State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii Adv.
Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980) (warrantless visual surveillance unconstitutional when high-
powered binoculars used).
In Illinois: People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979) (warrantless
aerial surveillance and physical trespass upheld under "open fields exception") cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
In Tennessee: State v. Layne, No. 80-171-11 (Tenn. Crim. App.-Nashville June 18,
1981) (warrantless aerial surveillance upheld when property in "open view"). But see State
v. Lilly, No. 2 (Tenn. Crim. App.-Jackson June 19, 1980) (warrantless aerial surveillance in
absence of exigent circumstances is unconstitutional; evidence suppressed on other
grounds).
A recent law review note has criticized these cases, which hold that most forms of war-
rantless aerial surveillance are not constitutionally protected. Note, Aerial Surveillance:
Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 271 (1981); see also Comment,
Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 505 (1975).
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tation of privacy test because his property could be observed from
the air.'
This Recent Development will explore this new area of crimi-
nal constitutional law and focus on three different approaches
courts have taken in responding to fourth amendment challenges
to evidence obtained by warrantless aerial surveillance. Questions
posed by these challenges include (a) whether a person who con-
ceals his property from ground view has shown a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy; (b) whether the altitude of aerial surveillance de-
termines the unreasonableness of the search; (c) whether police are
using aerial surveillance to sidestep the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement; and (d) whether technologically aided observa-
tion of areas not observable with the naked eye should be subject
to the warrant requirement.
Although the case law is sparse, the majority view is that war-
rantless aerial surveillance does not, in most cases, constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment." As a re-
sult, courts following the majority view have not subjected aerial
observation to the safeguards of the warrant requirement. This Re-
cent Development proposes several modifications in the prevailing
constitutional analysis of aerial surveillance that would frequently
subject the surveillance to fourth amendment regulation, striking a
more appropriate balance between the use of an effective police
tool and the privacy rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. From the Trespass Doctrine to Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
The fourth amendment guarantees the public the right to be
free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." 10 The words of the
fourth amendment are simple, but their application to the realities
8. In United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133
(1981), defendants' property was obscured from any land or sea observation and was visible
only through aerial surveillance. The court reasoned that since the area under surveillance
was on the United States seacoast border, which was routinely patrolled by Coast Guard
helicopters, the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 1290; see
also United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy for areas in open view); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (1980) (common habits of farmers do not permit reasonable privacy expectation in
their fields).
9. See supra note 7.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of criminal law has been problematic."" The English common-law
notion of privacy, an essential concept in the development of
fourth amendment law, required an actual physical intrusion-a
trespass-before a violation of the privacy right would be found.12
The leading case of Entick v. Carrington"s put forth the maxim
that the eye or ear, absent physical intrusion, could not alone com-
mit a search.1 4 Therefore, eavesdropping and spying were not vio-
lative of the English common-law privacy right.
The English rule gained popularity in the United States, and
the Supreme Court followed a trespass-oriented definition of a
fourth amendment "search" well into the twentieth century.5 In
the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States"6 the Court, confronted
with a case of telephone wiretapping, applied an eighteenth cen-
tury rule of law to a twentieth century problem. The Court held
that wiretapping of a telephone conversation was neither a search
nor a seizure under the fourth amendment because mere listening
without a physical intrusion was not a trespass.1 7
Olmstead remained good law for almost forty years, but be-
cause the use of electronic surveillance by police became so wide-
spread and intrusive, the Court devised a new standard for evalu-
ating fourth amendment claims. The 200-year-old trespass
doctrine fell in Katz v. United States.18 Tailored to fit the modern
problems of electronic surveillance, Katz redefined fourth amend-
ment analysis so that search and seizure were no longer tied to
notions of property and trespass. The Katz standard for determin-
ing if a search or seizure has occurred is whether a person had a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area, object, or activity
subject to police scrutiny. 9 In Katz the Court allowed the defend-
ant to invoke the fourth amendment to protect his conversations
over the telephone in a closed public telephone booth.20 Justice
11. Consider Justice Frankfurter's often-quoted remark that "[t]he course of true law
pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not.. . run smooth." Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
13. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
14. "[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass . . . .. Id. at
1066.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of spyglass does not
violate fourth amendment because the eye cannot commit trespass).
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 464-66.
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 348.
412 [Vol. 35:409
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Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz is generally considered the
source of the expectation of privacy standard.21 Under the first
prong of the two-part Katz test, a defendant must show that he
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the area, object, or activ-
ity upon which the state intruded. The second part of the test
requires that the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy be
one that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' -123
Under the Katz test, when police have violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy a search has occurred and the fourth
amendment warrant requirement is triggered. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that warrantless searches are presumptively
unconstitutional unless the state can show that exigent circum-
stances surrounded the search. The Court places a premium on
search warrants because the process by which the warrant is issued
allows a "neutral and detached magistrate" to determine whether
probable cause exists for the search.25 The rationale for the war-
rant requirement is that a neutral and detached magistrate's deci-
sion on whether a person's privacy right should be invaded is pref-
erable to the same decision made by the law enforcement officer
who is directly engaged in ferreting out crime.28 The policeman, in
his zeal to gather evidence of crime, may fail to consider fully soci-
ety's privacy interests before he decides to make a search. Thus,
the warrant requirement subjects the search to two judicial
checks-the pre-search warrant proceeding when the magistrate is-
sues the warrant and the suppression hearing at or before trial.
Violation of the fourth amendment warrant requirement in-
validates the search and subjects all evidence gathered in the ille-
gal search to suppression at trial.27 The application of this exclu-
21. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing language in Harlan's concur-
ring opinion as the essence of the Katz holding).
22. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 357. Exceptions to the warrant requirement include situations in which po-
lice conduct a search while engaged in "hot pursuit," after obtaining permission to search,
or incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at 357-58.
25. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965). The Supreme Court says
probable cause exists when facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, which is
corroborated by trustworthy information, is sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable cau-
tion to believe that the alleged offense has occurred or will occur. Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
26. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965).
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to the
states. The Court stated that "the purpose of the rule is to deter-to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to
disregard it." Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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sionary rule to fourth amendment violations sometimes results in
the suppression of highly probative evidence and the acquittal of a
guilty defendant.2 In recent years members of the Supreme Court,
including Chief Justice Burger, have been highly critical of the ex-
clusionary rule and its effect on efficient law enforcement.29 Judi-
cial hostility to the rule may result in a limitation of substantive
fourth amendment rights because the parameters of the exclusion-
ary rule are determined by a court's definition- of "search" and
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Therefore, the applicability of
the fourth amendment to police conduct is sometimes dependent
upon a particular judge's attitude of the proper scope of the exclu-
sionary rule.30 -
B. The Open Fields Exception
One vestige of the pre-Katz interpretation of the fourth
amendment is the "open fields" exception. In 1924 the Supreme
Court held in Hester v. United States$' that a physical intrusion
onto an open field, outside the curtilage of the homestead, was not
subject to fourth amendment regulation.2 Justice Holmes' brief
opinion stated that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and
effects,' is not extended to the open fields."3"
Since Katz, courts and litigants have speculated whether the
The exclusionary rule is also triggered in fourth amendment cases under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, which makes all information gathered as the result of an illegal
search subject to suppression at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); infra note 129.
28. Judge Cardozo summarized the potential effect of the exclusionary rule: "[T]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
29. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Chief Justice Bur-
ger, in a dissent, called the exclusionary rule "sterile and practically ineffective." Id. at 415
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Chief Justice wrote in
a concurring opinion that the exclusionary rule is a "Draconian, discredited device." Id. at
500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
30. For example, in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978), the Justice, motivated at least in part by a desire to avoid exclusion of evidence
essential to the prosecution's case, found that the defendants were not protected by the
fourth amendment because they had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the glove com-
partment of the car in which they were passengers.
31. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
32. Id. at 59. "Curtilage" is the enclosed land and buildings immediately surrounding
the dwelling house. United States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D. Or. 1937).
33. 265 U.S. at 59.
[Vol. 35:409414
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open fields exception remains viable. If the fourth amendment
protects a person in a public phone booth, should it not also pro-
tect him in open fields if he can establish a reasonable expectation
of privacy in that area? Application of the Katz two-part test
might allow courts to abandon the open fields exception when a
person exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, however, may contain the
language that has kept the open fields doctrine alive. Harlan noted
that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home
* . .and unlike a field, . . .a person has a constitutionally pro-
tected reasonable expectation of privacy."35 Harlan's "unlike a
field" comment may be construed to give Hester new life under the
Katz standard and to confirm that a person can never have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in an open field. Under this inter-
pretation of Katz, there can never be a fourth amendment
"search" of an open field.
The leading open fields case after Katz, Air Pollution Vari-
ance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.," reaffirmed Hester. In Air
Pollution Variance Board the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment did not prohibit a state health inspector's warrantless
entry onto the company's grounds to make air pollution tests.3 7
Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the open
fields exception applied because the smoke from the factory's
chimneys, which was the subject of the inspector's tests, could be
seen in the sky by anyone in the immediate area.3 8 Thus, sights
seen in the open fields are not protected by the fourth amendment,
according to the Air Pollution Variance Board Court. The Douglas
opinion, however, may raise more questions than it answers. Air
Pollution Variance Board does not cite Katz, and the Court's
analysis of the fourth amendment issue makes no mention of the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard.3 9 Relying on Air Pollu-
34. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
35. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924)) (emphasis added).
36. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
37. Id. at 864-65. The inspector entered the factory grounds to observe the smoke
emissions and make the tests. The Court noted that the inspector did not enter any offices
or inspect any files or papers. According to the Court his "trespass" was within the open
fields exception of Hester.
38. Id.
39. Justice Douglas may have reasoned that the open fields exception eliminates the
possibility of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the area and hence Katz could not
apply. This explanation, however, was not suggested in his opinion.
1982]
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tion Variance Board, some courts have held that the fourth
amendment does not apply to searches and seizures in open
fields.40 Other courts, unconvinced that Hester survived Katz, have
found that the application of the open fields exception to contem-
porary fourth amendment analysis is at best unclear.41 This Recent
Development next examines the various approaches courts have
taken when analyzing fourth amendment challenges to warrantless
aerial surveillance.
III. THREE APPROACHES TO WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Although the courts have given fourth amendment issues ex-
tensive attention, the constitutional problems of warrantless aerial
surveillance have not been widely discussed until recently. While
the vast majority of the courts have held warrantless aerial surveil-
lance to be constitutional, the courts are divided in their approach
to this problem. The Supreme Court's open fields exception makes
the constitutional analysis relatively simple-the fourth amend-
ment does not apply to open fields and, therefore, warrantless ae-
rial surveillance of an open field is not regulated by the fourth
amendment.42 Many state and federal courts, however, reject the
open fields exception in dealing with aerial surveillance and substi-
tute for it the notion of "open view" and the Katz test. Some of
these courts have adopted a per se approach and have held that no
reasonable expectation of privacy can inhere in an area or activity
that is in open view, including those only visible from the air.'
40. See, e.g., Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980) (warrantless
police entry onto defendant's fenced corn field to look for marijuana is not unreasonable
search under open fields exception), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); People v. Lashmett,
71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979) (warrantless aerial surveillance of farm equip-
ment in open fields is constitutional), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1158 (4th Cir. 1980) ("The
application of Hester remains unclear."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); State v. Lakin,
588 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tenn. 1979) (under federal law, continued applicability of Hester after
Katz is a "very close question").
42. People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1081 (1980).
43. The courts adopting this analysis do not use the term "per se" in describing the
approach they take to an aerial surveillance case. This Recent Development refers to this
open view approach as a per se standard because it appropriately describes the effect the
strict construction of the open view doctrine has on the second part of the Katz
test-whether defendant's subjective privacy expectation is objectively reasonable. The lan-
guage these courts use indicates that a defendant may never establish a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in an open field or area that is visible from the air, regardless of the mea-
sures he takes to shield the property from reasonable public view. See, e.g., United States v.
Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (expectation of privacy not reasonable when
416
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Other jurisdictions, while usually allowing warrantless aerial obser-
vations, hold that a person may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in areas and activities in open view, depending on a num-
ber of circumstances surrounding the observation." This approach
will be referred to as the qualified open view analysis. The circum-
stances most often influencing the courts adhering to the qualified
open view approach include the altitude of the aerial surveillance,
whether the area had been concealed from ground view even
though not hidden from aerial view, whether the observation was
made with the naked eye or with a viewing device, and whether the
area under surveillance was subject to frequent overflights.
A. Open Fields Analysis
The Hester and Air Pollution Variance Board decisions devel-
oped the open fields exception when they held that fourth amend-
ment privacy protection does not apply to objects and activities in
an open field.45 The Illinois Court of Appeals applied this open
fields doctrine to the problem of aerial surveillance in People v.
Lashmett46 when it held that warrantless aerial surveillance of
stolen farm equipment on rural acreage was constitutional. Citing
Hester and Air Pollution Variance Board, the Lashmett court
ruled that the farm land under observation was an open field and,
therefore, not subject to the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment.47 Under the Lashmett analysis, virtually all forms of war-
rantless aerial surveillance are permissible. As long as the object or
activity is in an area open to aerial view, police may freely observe
area visible from air; open fields approach rejected in favor of Katz); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (defendant's subjective privacy expectation
held unreasonable); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy violated even though police used high-powered
binoculars); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy for open agricultural lands).
The California cases use this open view approach in aerial surveillance of agricultural
lands. This approach has been further developed in the California cases cited supra note 7.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless aerial
surveillance constitutional, but exceptions may exist), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981);
People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (altitude of surveillance a
determining circumstance); State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980)
(use of highly sophisticated viewing devices a determining circumstance); State v. Stachler,
58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (height and duration of aerial surveillance and use of
viewing devices determining circumstances); State v. Layne, No. 80-171-111 (Tenn. Crim.
App.-Nashville June 18, 1981) (adopted Stachler approach).
45. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
46. 71 II. App. 3d 429, 389 N.E.2d 888 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
47. Id. at 437, 389 N.E. 2d at 894.
19821
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without first obtaining a warrant. Although the Lashmett court
discussed the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, it did
not apply that test in its open fields analysis. A finding that an
object or activity is visible in the open field apparently precludes
further fourth amendment consideration under the Lashmett
analysis.
The Illinois court's use of the open fields doctrine has not
been widely followed. In federal jurisdictions, in which Hester and
Air Pollution Variance Board arguably control, many courts nev-
ertheless have expressly rejected the open fields approach in favor
of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. State courts
often resort to state constitutional law in refusing to adopt the
open fields exception.48 Courts that have rejected the open fields
doctrine have applied the Katz test and extended fourth amend-
ment protection to a property holder who can establish a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the area under surveillance.
United States v. DeBacker49 is an example of a federal court's
rejection of the open fields doctrine. The DeBacker court refused
to follow decisions in the Fifth50 and Ninth51 Circuits that would
have upheld the open fields doctrine in search and seizure cases. In
rejecting the open fields exception, DeBacker suggests that a de-
fendant could exhibit an expectation of privacy in open fields.52
Although the court eventually upheld the warrantless aerial sur-
veillance of the defendant's marijuana crop,53 the judge noted that
excluding open fields from fourth amendment protection "would
provide police with a carte blanche to investigate areas outside a
homestead's curtilage."54 In rejecting the open fields analysis
DeBacker adopted instead the open view approach and the Katz
test.55
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
49. 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
50. Id. at 1080-81; see United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.) (open fields
doctrine helpful in determining a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz test), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1978).
51. See United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.) (fourth amendment protec-
tion does not extend to open fields; open fields doctrine separate from Katz test), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978).
52. 493 F. Supp. at 1081. The court noted the unfair results that can stem from appli-
cation of the open fields exception and cited Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d
252 (1974), in which the court allowed police to enter defendants' fields without a warrant
and dig 14 or 15 holes until they finally unearthed a body. 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
53. 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of DeBacker as an "open view" case, see infra notes 80-84.
418 [Vol. 35:409
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Like many state courts, the Tennessee Supreme Court in
State v. Lakin56 applied state constitutional law to reject the open
fields exception. 7 Lakin, although not an aerial surveillance case,
held that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the open fields he cultivates. 8 Two years later in State v. Layne59
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals applied the open view
approach rather than the open fields analysis to scrutinize a war-
rantless aerial surveillance.60 Citing Lakin as having abolished the
open fields exception for Tennessee, Layne held that the defend-
ant must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
under surveillance to attain constitutional protection." The Layne
decision embraces the "open view" approach to aerial surveillance
problems and contains language that may allow a defendant to es-
tablish a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas in open view
depending upon several considerations.6 2 This Recent Develop-
ment next examines this open view approach to aerial surveillance
analysis, which utilizes the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
56. 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979). Lakin concerned the entry of police onto the defend-
ant's property in an effort to find either marijuana or a moonshine still.
57. The Lakin court rejected the open fields exception under article I, § 7 of the Ten-
nessee Constitution, which is identical to the fourth amendment of the federal constitution.
The court said that differences in common-law interpretation of the constitutional sections
accounted for the different result. 588 S.W.2d at 549 n.2.
58. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that it "has never used the phrase 'open
fields', and its decisions applying the state constitution have been somewhat more restrictive
than comparable federal cases." Id. at 548.
59. No. 80-171-HI (Tenn. Crim. App.-Nashville June 18, 1981). Prior to Layne, an-
other section of the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that warrantless air surveillance of a
defendant's marijuana patch from an altitude of 300 yards "was an illegal intrusion onto the
property since there were no exigent circumstances." State v. Lilly, No. 2, slip op. at 5
(Tenn. Crim. App.-Jackson June 19, 1980). The Layne court refused to follow the Lilly
opinion's lead and dismissed as dictum the aerial surveillance language in Lilly. No. 80-171-
II, slip op. at 4.
60. No. 80-171-11, slip op. at 10. Layne held that warrantless aerial surveillance of the
defendants' marijuana fields at an altitude of 1,800 feet was not a "search" regulated by the
fourth amendment or the state constitution. Since the contraband was in "open view," the
defendants had not exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy that would have triggered
fourth amendment protection. Id.
61. Id. at 6. The Tennessee Supreme Court chose not to review Layne, denying appli-
cation for appeal on Oct. 13, 1981. Thus, the state's law remains uncertain concerning the
point at which a person can, under the rule in Lakin, establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an open field subject to aerial surveillance.
62. Id. at 9. The Layne court adopted the approach taken by the Hawaii Supreme
Court in State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). Stachler followed the quali-
fied open view approach. Those considerations noted in Stachler and adopted in Layne
included altitude of surveillance, the use of highly sophisticated viewing devices, the fre-
quency and duration of the surveillance, and the frequency of general aviation overflights in
the area. No. 80-171-II, slip op. at 9.
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test to determine whether a fourth amendment violation has
occurred.
B. The Per Se Open View Analysis
Rejection of the open fields exception in both statee3 and fed-
eral 4 jurisdictions has made possible the application of the reason-
able expectation of privacy test to aerial surveillance problems.
Under the Katz test a person must first show a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the area, activity, or object that is the subject of
official scrutiny. Second, and more important, the expectation of
privacy must be deemed reasonable in the eyes of society-an ob-
jective determination. Many courts applying the expectation of
privacy test find that areas in "open view"-visible from the air in
an aerial surveillance context-are not protected by the fourth
amendment.6e These courts reason that even though a person ex-
hibits a subjective expectation of privacy by shielding his property
from ground view, the area's visibility from the air makes that pri-
vacy expectation objectively unreasonable."8
Since 1973 California appellate courts have published seven
opinions on aerial surveillance, all but one of which upheld the
constitutionality of the warrantless observations. In People v.
Sneed6 7 a California Court of Appeal held that warrantless aerial
surveillance at an altitude of twenty to twenty-five feet was uncon-
stitutional.68 Following Sneed, however, in Dean v. Superior
63. In Hawaii the supreme court has chosen to follow the Katz test instead of the
open fields doctrine, although the court has not explicitly rejected Hester. See, e.g., State v.
Knight, 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980) (reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in greenhouse, the contents of which were obscured from public view, even though
greenhouse was in an open field outside the curtilage); State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570
P.2d 1323 (1977) (although citing Hester, court applies Katz test and an open view
analysis).
64. Despite the apparent viability of Hester and the open fields doctrine in the federal
courts, at least two federal courts examining aerial surveillance cases have rejected the open
fields approach. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (Katz test controlling
for fourth amendment issues; Hester not even cited), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981);
United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (determination that an area is
an open field does not, without more, remove it from fourth amendment protection; Hester
rejected).
65. For examples of this approach to aerial surveillance, see cases cited supra note 43.
66. In contrast, infra part III, section C discusses a derivation of the open view analy-
sis that allows a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist under certain circumstances, even
though the area or activity may be visible from the air. See cases cited supra note 44.
67. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
68. While the Sneed court acknowledged that the defendant had not met the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test, the focus of the court's concern was on the extremely
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Court 9 another division of the Courts of Appeal permitted aerial
surveillance without a warrant of all agricultural land visible from
the air.70 Dean held that Sneed was limited to low-altitude surveil-
lance cases.' Subsequent decisions have followed the Dean analy-
sis, holding that because the land is in open view, even if the prop-
erty holder has shielded his land from ground observation, no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is possible.72  The
rationale for the California rule is that farmers do not normally
expect privacy from aerial observation of their crop lands. There-
fore, based on the "common habits" of agriculturalists, society can-
not reasonably tolerate a privacy expectation for a farmer who
grows marijuana on his acreage. 3
One of the most recent pronouncements of the California
Courts of Appeal occurred in People u. Joubert,74 which held that
"anyone who grows marijuana in the open today does so at the risk
of being spotted by flying police officers. '7 5 The Joubert court
stated that only the agriculturalist who grows his contraband in a
hothouse completely obscured from aerial observation may suc-
cessfully assert a fourth amendment challenge under the Katz
test.7 1 The California rule, however, may be limited to observation
of agricultural fields. Aerial surveillance of factory sites,7 7 outdoor
swimming pools, or sunbathing areas7 8 may be subject to fourth
amendment protection because they are "areas expectedly private
low altitude of the surveillance. Id. at 543, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151; see infra text accompany-
ing note 71.
69. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
70. The Dean court stated that "aside from an uncommunicated need to hide his clan-
destine activity, the occupant exhibits no reasonable expectation of privacy consistent with
the common habits of persons engaged in agriculture." Id. at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
71. Id. at 116-17, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89. "Reasonable expectations of privacy may
ascend into the airspace and claim Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
72. See Tuttle v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 320, 174 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 571 (1981); People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1981); People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980); Burkholder v.
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979); People v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974) (aerial surveillance of stolen auto behind five-
foot high fence; only nonagricultural California case).
73. See, e.g., Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589
(1973).
74. 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981).
75. Id. at-, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
76. Id. at-, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
77. Id. at-, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 432 (reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for
"areas used in ordinary business operations.") (quoting Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 112, 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973)).
78. Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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according to the common habits of mankind."' 9
The open view approach of the California courts has also been
adopted by one federal district court. In United States v. DeBack-
ers° a Michigan federal court held that a farmer could establish a
subjective expectation of privacy by shielding his contraband crop
from ground view. That privacy expectation, however, could not be
reasonable when the area under surveillance was visible from the
air.81 DeBacker held that even though the defendant had a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in his fields, police use of aerial surveil-
lance as a law enforcement tool outweighed the privacy concern.82
The court expressed little concern that the aerial observation oc-
curred at an altitude of only fifty feet, in apparent violation of
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safe altitude regulations.8
Moreover, the DeBacker court ignored state court holdings that
"reasonable expectations of privacy may ascend into the airspace
and claim Fourth Amendment protection. ' ' "
The single determining element in the open view analysis used
by most of the California courts and the DeBacker court is
whether the area is visible from the air. This narrow interpretation
of the open view analysis creates what amounts to a per se rule,
not unlike the open fields doctrine. Even though the property
holder may demonstrate that he has the subjective expectation of
privacy required by the first prong of the Katz test, because his
property is visible from the air he can never satisfy the second
prong of the Katz test-a demonstration that his expectation of
privacy is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Since most
open areas are visible from the air, the result of this per se open
view analysis is that open areas cannot receive fourth amendment
protection. Thus, police in jurisdictions applying this analysis may
employ the potent tool of aerial surveillance unchecked by the
warrant requirement.
79. Id.
80. 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
81. Id. at 1081.
82. The DeBacker court cited support for the notion that the Katz standard actually
might be a balancing test. Surprisingly, this support came from a dissenting opinion by
Justice Harlan, originator of the two-part reasonable expectation of privacy test. Id.; see
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. 493 F. Supp. at 1081. The California Courts of Appeal have expressed greater con-
cern about the altitude of surveillance. See infra note 92.
84. State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 418, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977); see also People
v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (warrantless aerial observation at 20-25
feet unconstitutional).
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C. The Qualified Open View Approach
Some courts analyzing aerial surveillance problems have
carved out exceptions to the per se open view rationale and find
that under certain circumstances the fourth amendment may pro-
tect areas openly observable from the air. These courts hold that a
person may establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
open field or an area in open view. Circumstances that may deter-
mine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists include
the altitude of surveillance, 85 the use of technological viewing aids
in the observation, 6 the frequency of overflights in the area, 7 and
the frequency and duration of aerial surveillance.88
The circumstance most frequently determining the outcome of
a case in a court following the qualified open view approach is the
altitude of surveillance. Courts are also becoming increasingly sen-
sitive to the warrantless use of scientific viewing aids to observe
what could not be seen with the naked eye.89 The other two cir-
cumstances-frequency of overflights and frequency and duration
of the actual aerial surveillance-are often mentioned in opinions,
but no published case has held warrantless aerial surveillance un-
constitutional because of them.
The central question in this analysis becomes at what point
the conduct of the property holder creates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Must a person cover his property with an opaque
dome to obscure the view of overflying lawmen? If not, at what
point short of construction of an opaque dome will a person estab-
lish a constitutionally protected privacy right? The courts have not
clearly answered these difficult questions. This Recent Develop-
ment suggests that after the defendant's conduct satisfies the first
prong of the Katz test-after he has asserted a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy-the focus of the inquiry should shift to the nature
of the investigatory techniques police used to gather the evidence.
If the police found it necessary to resort to extraordinary tech-
85, People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (warrantless aerial
surveillance at 20-25 feet is unconstitutional).
86. State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980) (warrantless visual
surveillance unconstitutional when high-powered binoculars used).
87. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (frequent aerial surveillance
of seacoast border reduced defendant's expectation of privacy in that area), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 133 (1981).
88. State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 418, 570 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977) (continual aerial
surveillance for prolonged time periods could be a consideration, although not relevant to
instant case).
89. See State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980).
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niques to spot the incriminating evidence, then the defendant's ex-
pectation of privacy should stand a greater likelihood of being
deemed reasonable. The necessity for police to use the more intru-
sive investigative techniques indicates that the defendant has
taken measures to establish a privacy expectation society should
deem reasonable. This Recent Development next examines the al-
titude of surveillance and technology considerations and discusses
a third issue not usually considered by the courts-the necessity of
preserving the warrant requirement in aerial surveillance.
1. Altitude of Surveillance
In People v. Sneed,90 the first case to confront the constitu-
tionality of warrantless aerial surveillance, a California Court of
Appeal held that airborne observations at an altitude of twenty to
twenty-five feet constituted an unreasonable search. The mari-
juana plants observed by the police helicopter pilot were shielded
from public view and near, but not within the curtilage of, the de-
fendant's house. 1 The Sneed court noted that the low-flying heli-
copter probably was in violation of state and federal aviation
safety laws.9 2 Subsequent California cases have upheld the consti-
tutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance, but have appeared to
keep the Sneed altitude-of-surveillance standard intact.93 Neither
the Sneed decision nor any other case has formulated an absolute
minimum altitude for warrantless aerial surveillance, although the
FAA safe altitude regulations are often given as guidelines. 4
In other states, courts have been quick to acknowledge
Sneed's altitude-of-surveillance concerns. 95 But while many juris-
90. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
91. Id. at 539, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
92. The Sneed court cited CAL. PUB. Urm. CODE § 21403 (West Supp. 1981), which
provides in part that "[f]light in aircraft over the land and waters of this State is lawful,
unless at altitudes below those prescribed by federal authority." Id. at 543 n.1, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 151 n.1.
The applicable federal regulations are contained in the FAA regulations on minimum
safe altitudes, 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1981). The regulations limit overflights over congested ar-
eas to altitudes "1,000 feet above the highest obstacle." Id. § 91.79(b). For overflights over
"other than congested areas" the altitude limit is "not ... closer than 500 feet to any per-
son, vessel, vehicle, or structure." Id. § 91.79(c). Helicopters are exempt from the altitude
restrictions so long as they are operated in a safe manner. Id. § 91.79(d).
The Sneed court erroneously refers to these regulations as being promulgated by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 543 n.1, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151 n.1.
93. Subsequent California decisions have not followed Sneed, but the cases have dis-
tinguished Sneed because of the very low altitude of observation.
94. See supra note 92 (FAA regulations).
95. See State v. Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 418, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977); State v.
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dictions have stated that the fourth amendment would apply to
low-altitude surveillance, none since Sneed has suppressed evi-
dence because of the low altitude of observation. In State v.
Stachler96 the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional-
ity of aerial surveillance at 300 feet, but noted in dictum that "[i]f
the lower court had found that the height of a helicopter was un-
reasonably low or violated applicable laws and regulations,. . . we
might well decide differently. '9 7 In State v. Layne9 the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the Stachler aerial surveillance
analysis9" and discussed the height-of-surveillance issue.100 The
Layne court cited the Air Commerce Act of 1926, FAA regulations,
and state common law to reject the ancient ad coelum doctrine101
and held that warrantless surveillance at 1800 feet was proper.102
A contrasting viewpoint to Sneed and the dictum in Stachler
is the opinion in United States v. DeBacker103 in which warrant-
less aerial observation at fifty feet was held constitutional. The
DeBacker decision demonstrates the difference between the per se
open view analysis, which does not recognize any objectively rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in open areas visible from the air,
and the qualified open view analysis, which considers several cir-
cumstances in determining whether the property owner has met
the second prong of the Katz test. The visibility of the property
from the air is the main consideration that removes that area from
fourth amendment protection in the DeBacker analysis. Under
Sneed and Stachler, however, other circumstances may influence
whether the surveillance becomes a "search" and attains constitu-
tional protection.
If the proper test to apply in a fourth amendment privacy
analysis is whether the state intruded on a reasonable expectation
of privacy, then arguably the altitude of surveillance is irrelevant.
A warrantless search that intrudes on a reasonable expectation of
privacy from an altitude of fifty feet is just as unconstitutional as
the warrantless search from one thousand feet. In either instance
Layne, No. 80-171-Il1, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Crim. App.-Nashville June 18, 1981).
96. 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
97. Id. at 418-19, 570 P.2d at 1328.
98. No. 80-171-111 (Tenn. Crim. App.-Nashville June 18, 1981).
99. See supra note 62.
100. No. 80-171-HI, slip op. at 10.
101. "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos. (The owner of a piece
of land owns everything above or below it to an indefinite extent)." Id.
102. Id.
103. 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
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the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test should determine
whether the fourth amendment has been violated. The low altitude
concern in aerial surveillance is reminiscent of the trespass doc-
trine-which tied the degree of physical intrusion to a fourth
amendment violation-abandoned by the Supreme Court in Katz.
The weakness in the altitude-of-surveillance standard is also evi-
dent in situations in which the government employs a telescopic
satellite, miles above the earth, to make the observations.104 The
government's spy satellites,105 which silently and omnisciently ob-
serve and photograph the activities of its subjects, may be more
offensive to fourth amendment rights than the low-flying helicop-
ter in Sneed.
2. Technology
The Supreme Court has long recognized the special intrusive-
ness of electronic surveillance and expanded fourth amendment
protection to encompass the problems of bugging and eavesdrop-
ping.10 6 Courts, however, have been reluctant to require a warrant
as a prerequisite to the use of sophisticated viewing devices. The
majority rule is that devices such as high-powered binoculars, tele-
scopic cameras, and infra-red telescopes only enhance what could
be seen with the naked eye and, therefore, their use does not con-
stitute a fourth amendment search.10 7 These courts reason that if
the policeman is in a place where he has the right to be, anything
he observes is in open view. A growing number of courts, however,
hold that a law officer may not make warrantless, technologically
aided observations of areas within the privacy zone when those ar-
eas could not be viewed with the naked eye. 108
104. Satellite surveillance and reconnaissance have been used widely in international
intelligence gathering. One writer has noted that the development of film quality and the
advent of the Titan booster allow satellites 100 miles in the air to film objects on earth less
than a foot in length. Greenwood, RECONNAISSANCE, SURVEILLANCE AND ARMS CONTROL 7
(Adelphi Paper No. 88, 1972).
105. See supra note 4. State governments also make use of satellite photographs from
the Earth Resources Observation Satellite Data Center, in Sioux Falls, S.D., for detection of
large marijuana fields. Tell, supra note 2, at 28, cols. 1, 3.
106. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
107. See generally United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980) (extensive use
of technological aids without a warrant did not violate reasonable expectation of privacy),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977)
(such devices only "magnify" senses).
108. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1980) (warrantless telescopic
viewing inside a person's house unconstitutional); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252
(D. Hawaii 1976) (same); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979)
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In aerial surveillance cases the use of high-powered binoculars
or telescopic photography on helicopter overflights increases the
potency-and intrusiveness-of the aerial observation. In United
States v. Allen1' 9 the Ninth Circuit noted,
We agree with the defendants that a person need not construct an opaque
bubble over his or her land in order to have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy regarding the activities occurring there in all circumstances. Given the
sophistication of electronic photographic devices today, there probably are
few unenclosed locations which could not be observed from some airborne
location.110
Two recent Hawaii cases expressed concern about the intru-
siveness of technologically aided observations by police. In State v.
Stachler1 1 the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that aerial observa-
tion with binoculars of defendants' fields was constitutional.112 The
Hawaii court, however, noted that if "highly sophisticated viewing
devices"' l had been employed, the warrantless observation might
have violated a section of the state constitution that specifically
prohibits governmental invasion of privacy.1 14 The Stachler court
declined to hold that the use of a helicopter or binoculars to ob-
serve the defendant's fields constituted the employment of "highly
sophisticated viewing devices. '" 5 Three years later, in State v.
Knight,116 Hawaii's highest court exhibited greater sensitivity to
the use of technological aids. Although the court held that aerial
observation by helicopter of defendant's land and greenhouse was
proper, a subsequent warrantless observation of the inside of the
greenhouse with high-powered binoculars was held to be an unrea-
sonable search.11 7 Knight adopted the rule that a warrant is re-
quired for use of technologically aided viewing devices that allow
observation of areas not normally visible to the naked eye.118
At least one commentator has suggested that helicopters and
(warrantless use of binoculars to view obscene films unconstitutional).
109. United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133
(1981).
110. Id. at 1289.
111. 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
112. Id. at 421 n.6, 570 P.2d at 1329 n.6.
113. Id. at 419, 570 P.2d at 1328.
114. HAwAII CONsT. art. 1, § 5 (1968).
115. 58 Hawaii at 419, 570 P.2d at 1328.
116. 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980).
117. Id. at-, 621 P.2d at 373. The difference between Stachler and Knight appears to
be that in Stachler the observation with the binoculars could have been made with the
naked eye. In Knight the police needed the telescopic aids to make the observation. See
State v. Ward, 62 Hawaii 509, 617 P.2d 568 (1980).
118. 63 Hawaii at, 621 P.2d 373; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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other aircraft used in aerial surveillance be treated as highly so-
phisticated viewing devices. 119 Although this position has received
no judicial support,120 a strong argument could be made that when
aircraft are equipped with sophisticated viewing and photographic
devices they become observation aids that should be regulated by
the fourth amendment. Even if a helicopter is not classified as a
viewing device per se, a telescopic satellite should always be con-
sidered a viewing device. Technological advances in observation
satellites allow the viewing and recording of activities on the
ground 2 1 without putting the subject of satellite surveillance on
notice that he is being watched. As satellite technology develops,
satellite surveillance is likely to become more intrusive upon pri-
vacy rights. Courts, therefore, must invoke the fourth amendment
to protect against the improper use of this effective, though poten-
tially invasive, police tool.
3. The Warrant Requirement
A finding that aerial surveillance is not a "search" removes the
observation from fourth amendment regulation and frees police to
use this tactic without the issuance of a warrant. In almost all ae-
rial surveillance cases considered by the appellate courts, the po-
lice have undertaken the observations only after receiving informa-
tion about the area to be searched.12 2 Thus, aerial surveillance has
been used to corroborate information, or, in some cases, to effect a
search of the area. In many of these cases the police have used
aerial surveillance to obtain information that could not otherwise
be obtained without a search warrant.
Sometimes police aerial surveillance is a prelude to other war-
rantless privacy intrusions, such as physical trespass or electronic
surveillance. An example of this use is found in United States v.
119. See Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?, 55 CAL. ST.
B.J. 451, 454 (1980) (analysis of California aerial surveillance cases). For an opposing view
see Kaye, Aerial Surveillance: Private vs. Public Expectations, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 258 (1981).
120. For example, in United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977), the
court characterized helicopters, binoculars, and radar as objects that merely "magnify" the
observer's senses. The court said these devices were not as intrusive to privacy as an elec-
tronic beeper, which does more than magnify the police officer's senses.
121. See supra notes 4 & 104-05.
122. For a listing of all reported aerial surveillance cases, see supra note 7. In all of
those cases that reported the authorities' motivation for the aerial search, the police had
made the surveillance after obtaining information that contraband might be found on the
property. The observations were not made inadvertently by police on routine patrol. The
quality and detail of the information given to police prior to the aerial search varies from
case to case and is often difficult to ascertain from facts given.
428 [Vol. 35:409
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Allen,12 3 in which the Coast Guard, on aerial patrol along the sea-
coast border, observed suspicious activity around defendant's
property. Subsequent aerial surveillance led authorities to suspect
the defendant was engaged in a large drug smuggling operation.
Further warrantless surveillance occurred from the air and sea and
on the ground in the form of electronic heat sensors that moni-
tored entrances and departures from the property. The Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged holdings that limited the warrantless use of
technological aids, but, using the qualified open view approach,
held that an unconstitutional search had not occurred.124
Another example of the extent to which police may be allowed
to engage in warrantless observation is apparent in State v.
Layne.1 25 In Layne a Tennessee Highway Patrol pilot, acting on an
informant's tip, surveyed the defendant's property from an alti-
tude of 1800 feet and determined that marijuana was being culti-
vated on the land. The pilot landed the helicopter on defendant's
property and, along with several other patrolmen, captured a group
of persons who were tilling the fields. The police also observed, ap-
parently in plain view, the contents of a barn "chock-full" of har-
vested marijuana. 12 6 The raid, which reportedly netted seven to
eight tons of marijuana, was carried out without a search warrant
and, apparently, without any attempt to obtain a warrant.1 2 7
The Layne court determined that the defendants did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in fields that were in the "open
view" of the airborne patrolman. The court analogized the aerial
observation to the situation of a police officer, acting on a tip, who
sees a husband assaulting his wife in the front yard of their
house. 28 The Layne court reasoned that the officer is justified in
going on the property to make the arrest because he has viewed a
crime in progress. The Layne court's analogy, however, ignores the
special intrusiveness of aerial surveillance. Furthermore, in the
Layne situation the police could have attempted to obtain a search
warrant following their observation instead of effecting an immedi-
123. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 133 (1981).
124. Id. at 1288, 1290.
125. No. 80-171-rI (Tenn. Crim. App.-Nashville June 18, 1981).
126. Id., slip op. at 2.
127. The Layne court stated that the warrantless intrusion on the property was proper
because the airborne patrolmen saw the unharvested marijuana in the field and "[o]bserving
a felony being committed in their presence, they clearly were justified in descending to the
ground to arrest these appellants." Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 11-12.
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ate physical search and seizure of the contraband.12 The police
would not have risked losing the evidence because, as the court
noted, the marijuana plants were so large that it took two days for
police using chainsaws to harvest them. 130 Since the evidence
probably would not have been destroyed while a warrant was being
sought, any exigent circumstances argument proffered to justify
the warrantless search must be considered tenuous.
The extent of the warrantless intrusion in Layne becomes
even more disturbing when one considers the premium placed on
search warrants. The United States Supreme Court has long ex-
pressed a strong preference for search warrants. 31 The Tennessee
Supreme Court places a similar premium on searches pursuant to
warrants. In State v. Lakin,13 2 a case that suggests a person may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open area, 3 the
court noted that "the obtaining of a warrant does not ordinarily
impose insurmountable difficulties, particularly in the absence of
an emergency." 18
Authorities have often used warrantless aerial surveillance to
corroborate informants' tips as a means of establishing sufficient
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. The officer's first-hand
observation of the contraband would clearly meet the probable
cause requirement for issuance of a warrant. While this use of ae-
rial surveillance as corroboration before seeking a search warrant is
less offensive to the warrant requirement than a warrantless physi-
cal search, the initial aerial observation may still involve a
"search" of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. In United
States v. DeBacker'3 5 and State v. Knight 8 police obtained
search warrants after their aerial observations. Under traditional
129. If the police had sought a warrant before conducting the raid, at least a portion of
the police conduct would have been subject to some degree of scrutiny by a magistrate.
Obtaining a search warrant after the initial aerial observation would have been less intrusive
than the immediate search and seizure. If, however, the initial observation constituted an
illegal warrantless search, then a subsequent search warrant based on that illegally obtained
information would be invalid under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See supra note
27; infra note 137.
130. No. 80-171-I1, slip op. at 2.
131. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06 (1965). The Court stated that a
system which allows a "neutral and detached magistrate" to make the decision whether to
invade the suspect's privacy is better than allowing the law enforcement officer to make that
decision.
132. 588 S.W.2d 544 (Tenn. 1979).
133. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
134. 588 S.W.2d at 548.
135. 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
136. 63 Hawaii Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980).
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fourth amendment analysis, the issuance of search warrants after
the surveillance does not cure the taint of the initial warrantless
observation.13 7 This analysis was applied in Knight and the war-
rantless telescopic observation of defendant's greenhouse was held
unconstitutional because police obtained a warrant after gathering
the "tainted" evidence. 3 8 In a similar fact situation the DeBacker
court found that no search had occurred and, hence, that the
fourth amendment did not apply.13 In both DeBacker and Knight
the police acted properly in seeking warrants. Arguably, the of-
ficers were using aerial surveillance as the least intrusive method
to corroborate information so that they would have probable cause
to obtain a search warrant. Even though the initial police surveil-
lance was not subject to prior judicial scrutiny, at least "a neutral
and detached magistrate 1 40 provided a check on the police activity
before the physical search and seizure of the contraband. Certainly
both cases concerned police behavior preferable to that in Layne.
The Layne court allowed aerial surveillance, physical intrusion
onto the property, search of a barn, and arrest of suspects without
the safeguards of a warrant.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
The existing case law has not provided adequate guidance in
determining when an area visible from the air becomes constitu-
tionally protected. The open fields and open view per se ap-
proaches allow warrantless aerial surveillance in virtually all cir-
cumstances. The courts applying the qualified open view approach
often indicate that they will extend fourth amendment protection
to subjects of warrantless aerial surveillance, but holdings in the
defendant's favor are rare.1 41 As a result, the aerial surveillance
case law is greatly weighted in favor of law enforcement officials.
Important personal privacy interests and the constitutional war-
rant requirement, Which protects privacy interests, have not been
furthered by the courts' analyses in the three approaches. When a
person shields his property from every reasonable public
137. Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine information gathered in an Me-
gal search that leads to subsequent issuance of a warrant renders that warrant invalid. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
138. 63 Hawaii aL, 621 P.2d at 373.
139. 493 F. Supp. at 1081.
140. See supra note 131.
141. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (held warrantless
aerial surveillance unconstitutional).
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view-except an aerial view-he has asserted an important privacy
interest to which a judge should give substantial consideration.
Furthermore, the courts should express a strong preference for
search warrants to ensure adequate control of police activity that
infringes upon privacy interests.142
This Recent Development endorses the qualified open view
approach, but proposes a new list of considerations to be applied
when evaluating an aerial surveillance case. This proposed analysis
rejects the open fields doctrine. Instead, courts should apply the
Katz test to aerial surveillance. The per se open view approach,
however, which holds that no reasonable expectation of privacy
can exist in any open area visible from the air, is too narrow to
ensure protection of the public's privacy rights. A broader view of
the open view approach, which will subject government air surveil-
lance to the warrant requirement in certain circumstances, strikes
a more satisfactory balance between the use of a potent investiga-
tory tool and the preservation of constitutionally guaranteed pri-
vacy. Once the defendant has established a subjective expectation
of privacy under the first part of the Katz test, the reasonableness
of the warrantless observations should be examined.
The following considerations should guide the court in deter-
mining both the reasonableness of a warrantless search and the
reasonableness of the subjective privacy expectation. First, the
courts should examine whether the property holder exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy by shielding his property from
any reasonable public view. An area, object, or activity obscured
from all reasonable observation except an aerial view should not be
denied constitutional protection on the ground that it is in open
view. When the property holder has done all he reasonably can to
establish a privacy interest in the area despite its visibility from
the air, more should not be required. Second, to preserve the integ-
rity of the warrant requirement, the courts should examine
whether police made the aerial observation inadvertently during a
routine patrol or pursuant to a planned and focused "search" of a
specified area. If observation is not inadvertent, the police should
be required to obtain a search warrant prior to the surveillance or
make a good faith showing that they did not have enough informa-
tion to obtain a warrant.143 In effect, the courts would be applying
142. See supra part ]JI, section C.
143. If the jurisdiction were to adopt the reasonable suspicion standard for aerial
search warrants proposed infra part IV, section B in place of the probable cause require-
ment, then police would not have an excuse for failing to obtain a warrant before an over-
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a similar inadvertence requirement to aerial surveillance cases that
they apply to plain view searches.14 4 Last, the courts should follow
those holdings that prohibit warrantless use of highly sophisticated
viewing devices to monitor areas that could not be seen with the
naked eye.145
A. Public View Versus Open View
Many courts uphold warrantless aerial surveillance because
the subject of the surveillance is in "open view." These courts rea-
son that since the area under observation can be viewed from the
air, the person in control of that area has not shown an expectation
flight prompted by an informant's tip.
144. The inadvertence requirement for the plain view doctrine is discussed in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971). Some courts confuse "plain view" with "open view."
In "plain view" the observation takes place after an intrusion on a reasonable expectation of
privacy has occurred. If the original intrusion is justified, such as by consent, hot pursuit, a
warrant, or as incident to an arrest, objects in plain view will be admissible if the view was
inadvertent and the object was incriminating on its face.
In "open view" no search has occurred and, if the observer is legitimately on the prem-
ises, the fourth amendment and the inadvertence requirement do not apply. For a more
detailed discussion of the differences between "plain view" and "open view," see State v.
Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 417, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977).
145. In considering the elements of public view, inadvertence, and highly sophisticated
viewing devices in an analysis of aerial surveillance problems, these three hypotheticals may
be helpful.
(a) Officer A is on a routine aerial patrol. Using only his unaided powers of observation,
he sees contraband growing in a large field. The property holder has made no serious
efforts to shield his contraband from public view.
Result: The open view doctrine should apply. Warrantless aerial surveillance was proper
because the suspect did not show a subjective expectation of privacy.
(b) Officer A, acting on an informant's tip, put B's farm under aerial surveillance. A
suspects B of growing contraband on the premises, but he does not obtain a search
warrant. After a brief period of surveillance, A sees, with his unaided vision, the con-
traband growing between two rows of corn.
Result: In this case the suspect showed a subjective privacy expectation by planting the
contraband between rows of corn. Officer A may have had information enough to obtain a
search warrant before the aerial surveillance took place. His observations of B's field were
more like a focused "search" than an inadvertent sighting of something in open view. In a
jurisdiction with a modified probable cause standard, police could have obtained a search
warrant on their reasonable suspicions. In that case the warrantless intrusion should be
deemed unreasonable and the court should act to protect B's privacy interest.
(c) Officer A, acting on an informant's tip, puts B's property under aerial surveillance
on the suspicion that B is growing contraband. On the first overflight, A is unable to
confirm the tip. But on a subsequent overflight, A, armed with a high-powered tele-
scope, is able to see contraband growing under a canopy.
Result: This warrantless aerial surveillance should be an unconstitutional search. All three
elements-protection of property from public view, absence of police inadvertance, and the
use of sophisticated viewing devices-militate against a warrantless search and the courts
should act to preserve B's privacy interest.
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of privacy and, therefore, is not protected by the fourth amend-
ment. This simple analysis becomes complicated when the person
in control of the area shields it from routine public view. For ex-
ample, a marijuana farmer who hides his illegal crop behind a tall
fence and between rows of corn and barley has effectively obscured
it from his neighbor's view. Under the first part of the Katz test
the farmer has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by
conceaing his property from ground view. The crucial second
question is whether the farmer's expectation of privacy is. one that
society deems reasonable. Most courts have answered this question
in the negative. 146
The California courts hold that agriculturalists do not expect
-privacy from aerial observations of their fields. These courts, how-
ever, indicate that nonagricultural uses of open areas may create
an expectation of privacy society could deem reasonable. 14 7 Al-
though the courts have not ruled on what activities in open fields
may warrant constitutional protection, dicta in several cases hint
that industrial complexes, swimming pools, and sunbathing areas
may merit fourth amendment protection. 1
4
This listing of protected activities is too narrow. Persons who
take measures to secure privacy from ground-level observation ar-
guably expect privacy from aerial observation. The person who
chooses to live in an isolated area or who builds a fifteen-foot high
fence to block the view of his prying neighbor subjectively expects
privacy, whether it be from the ground or from the air. This expec-
tation surely is one that society would deem reasonable. The first
question courts should address then is whether the subject of the
surveillance has made reasonable attempts to shield the area from
non-aerial observation. 149 Once the property holder's subjective
privacy expectation has been established, the focus of the inquiry
should shift to the nature of the police surveillance to determine
the objective reasonableness of the privacy expectation. If the po-
lice found it necessary to use aerial surveillance to circumvent the
warrant requirement, then the courts should hold the subjective
146. See cases cited supra note 7.
147. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
148. Id.; see also People v. Joubert, 118 Cal. App. 3d 637,_, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 435
(1981) (the California "common habits" rule may be limited to agricultural areas).
149. Virtually all activities in open areas are to some degree visible from the air. Yet,
at least some of these activities merit privacy protection. A person should not be put to the
enormous difficulty and expense of concealing his actions from overhead view to ensure pri-
vacy. Surely a person should not have to enclose himself in an opaque dome to obtain the
protection of the fourth amendment.
[Vol. 35:409
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
privacy expectation to be reasonable, even though the area may
have been visible from the air.
A finding that a person can show a reasonable expectation of
privacy by obscuring his area from traditional public view would
not severely limit aerial surveillance as a police tool. Before the
police embarked on an aerial surveillance of a suspect whose prop-
erty was obscured from ground view, they would be required only
to obtain a warrant-the condition precedent to conventional gov-
ernment searches. Considering the great potential for privacy vio-
lation inherent in any aerial observation, courts must subject this
potent police tool to the warrant requirement.
B. Inadvertence
Courts could also uphold the integrity of the warrant require-
ment by imposing an inadvertence requirement on warrantless ae-
rial observations. This requirement, to be used in determining
whether an area under surveillance is constitutionally protected,
would be similar to the inadvertence required in the plain view
doctrine. 150 In most of the cases discussed in this Recent Develop-
ment, police made their aerial observations of specific targets fol-
lowing tips from informants and not while on routine aerial pa-
trols.15' The police put a specific area belonging to a specific person
or persons under surveillance without a warrant and "searched"
the area from their aerial vantage point. While society unquestion-
ably should continue to allow routine aerial police patrols, once
these patrols focus on a particular person, activity, or area, the sur-
veillance takes on characteristics of a "search," and the fourth
amendment warrant requirement should apply.
If the police have a reasonable suspicion that contraband ex-
ists on a suspect's property that is only observable from the air,
then they should seek the judicial authorization of a warrant
before invading the suspect's privacy. 52 This "reasonable suspi-
150. An inadvertence requirement was suggested in People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d
535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973), which held that low-altitude warrantless aerial surveillance
was an unreasonable search. The Sneed court stated, "[T]he officers were at the Fowler
ranch for the purpose of exploring the premises for the marijuana plants. They had no other
legitimate purpose for flying over the property. The marijuana plants were not discovered
by happenstance as an incident to other lawful activity." Id. at 542, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
151. See supra note 122.
152. "Reasonable suspicion" not amounting to probable cause should be sufficient
proof for the issuance of an aerial search warrant. Police could satisfy the reasonable suspi-
cion requirement by informing the magistrate of the need for the aerial surveillance, the
inability of normal police investigative procedures to confirm the suspicion, and a descrip-
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cion" standard would function in the same way as the modified
probable cause requirement in electronic surveillance cases. The
surveillance would be subject to "the procedure of antecedent jus-
tification before a magistrate 1 5 3 before police could implement it.
If the courts allowed aerial search warrants on a modified showing
of probable cause, then police would have no excuse for not ob-
taining judicial authorization prior to an overflight. The reasonable
suspicion standard, therefore, would eliminate the necessity of
warrantless aerial surveillance to corroborate informant's tips.,,
Furthermore, since police could obtain a search warrant more eas-
ily, they would be able to avoid the current problem of having evi-
dence excluded at trial as a result of their good faith efforts to
corroborate information needed to meet the full probable cause
standard. In other words, the modified probable cause standard
ensures that law enforcement will not have to resort to extraordi-
nary-and intrusive-investigative techniques to meet the warrant
requirement.
C. The Technology Consideration
Courts should follow the example of the Hawaii Supreme
Court in Knight and closely scrutinize police use of highly sophisti-
cated viewing devices in both ground and aerial surveillance. Aerial
surveillance with high-powered telescopic and infra-red viewing
aids is an effective police tool, but its potential for privacy intru-
sion is great. Warrantless use of technologically aided observation
should be prohibited in most cases. To effectuate this general rule,
a precise and easily understood definition of technologically aided
surveillance is necessary. The Hawaii court, for example, provided
tion of the specific intrusion on the privacy right. A lesser burden is justified for the issu-
ance of an aerial search warrant than for a traditional search warrant because properly lim-
ited aerial surveillance-under the court's control-is less intrusive than a full physical
search. The Supreme Court has authorized the use of a modified probable cause standard in
electronic surveillance cases. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
153. Id. at 330; see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). Electronic surveillance warrants require evidence of
probable cause and a showing that ordinary investigatory procedures have been, or will be,
unsuccessful. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(a)-(d). The Supreme Court rejected a less-than-probable
cause standard for electronic surveillance warrants in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967) ("reasonable ground" for electronic surveillance is insufficient).
154. Use of aerial surveillance as corroboration occurred in State v. Knight, 63 Hawaii
Adv. Sh. 7246, 621 P.2d 370 (1980) and United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D.
Mich. 1980). In Knight the court held the warrantless observation unreasonable because it
was made with highly sophisticated viewing devices that enabled the officers to see that
which was not observable with the naked eye.
436 [Vol. 35:409
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
the needed certainty by defining a viewing aid as a device that al-
lows a person to see something which otherwise would not be ob-
servable with the naked eye. 155 Under this simple and practical
definition, a helicopter is not a "viewing device" because observa-
tions from the aircraft could be made with the naked eye. Binocu-
lars and telescopes, however, fit within the definition when they
are powerful enough to allow observation of areas not ordinarily
viewable. The definition also is broad enough to encompass poten-
tially more intrusive observation devices such as "close look" satel-
lites and other forms of high technology aerial monitoring. 15 6
While law enforcement's aggressive use of new technology in
crime fighting should not be discouraged, courts must be willing to
expand their interpretation of the fourth amendment to ensure the
preservation of important privacy rights. The Supreme Court met
this challenge in Katz when it confronted the problem of electronic
surveillance. The Court, as well as state supreme courts, must con-
tinue to scrutinize closely the technological advances in law en-
forcement and their impact on the public's constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Aerial surveillance is a valuable and effective police tool. Ac-
cordingly, most courts have shown great deference to law enforce-
ment in applying the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
and in determining whether aerial observation is subject to the
warrant requirement. This Recent Development has illustrated
that aerial surveillance, like electronic eavesdropping, should be
subjected to the checks and balances of the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement.
Many courts are applying the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test to aerial surveillance situations, but their application of
the test, which too often results in aerial observation not being
classified as a "search," does not fully consider society's interest in
the privacy safeguards of the warrant requirement. When a person
shields the area outside his home from public view, he expects pri-
vacy. While open fields and areas outside the home traditionally
have not been given the legal protection the dwelling house has
enjoyed, the growing intrusiveness of law enforcement, through
155. State v. Ward, 62 Hawaii 509, -, 617 P.2d 568, 572 (1980); see also People v.
Arno, 90 Cal. App. 505, 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 625-26 (1979) (viewing aid defined as device
that allows a person to see that which is unobservable with the naked eye).
156. See supra notes 104-05.
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electronic and aerial surveillance, has created a need for further
privacy protection. This privacy protection must be greater than
that most courts now give to targets of warrantless aerial
surveillance.
An inadvertence requirement would encourage police to go
through the judicial process of obtaining a search warrant before
they place specific areas or persons under aerial surveillance. The
courts applying the inadvertence standard should also apply a
modified probable cause standard to preserve the spirit of the war-
rant requirement without penalizing the good faith efforts of police
to use the least intrusive means to corroborate informants' tips.
Finally, courts should be willing to modify their constitutional
analysis to encompass the use of highly sophisticated viewing
devices.
As aerial surveillance becomes a more widely used police tech-
nique, courts will be required to modify their long-held positions of
what constitutes "open view." Although aerial surveillance is an ef-
fective law enforcement tool, it should not be exempt from the
constitutional safeguards of the warrant requirement. Rather, the
courts should carefully act to prevent this efficient and aggressive
police surveillance technique from becoming the watchful eye of
"Big Brother."
KURT L. SCHMALZ
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